Philosophical Studies

, 156:111 | Cite as

Surveys, intuitions, knowledge attributions

Comments on Keith DeRose’s “Contextualism, Contrastivism, and X-Phi Surveys”



My thanks to the Oberlin Colloquium organizers and attendees; special thanks to Keith DeRose, Cindy Holder, Jennifer Nagel, and Joel Pust.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of VictoriaVictoriaCanada

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