Philosophical Studies

, 156:81 | Cite as

Contextualism, contrastivism, and X-Phi surveys



Knowledge Claim Survey Methodology Contrast Condition Knowledge Attribution Epistemic Standard 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.



Thanks to the organizers of the 2010 Oberlin Philosophy Colloquium, where I delivered this paper, and to the participants at the conference, especially to Patrick Rysiew, my commentator. Thanks to Jennifer Nagel and to Jonathan Schaffer for very helpful comments on an earlier draft.


  1. Austin, J. L. (1946). Other minds. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 20, 149–187.Google Scholar
  2. Beebe, J., & Buckwalter, W. The epistemic side-effect effect. Mind & Language, (forthcoming).Google Scholar
  3. Buckwalter, W. Knowledge isn’t closed on Saturdays. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, (forthcoming).Google Scholar
  4. Cullen, S. Survey-driven romanticism. European Review of Philosophy, (forthcoming).Google Scholar
  5. DeRose, K. (1992). Contextualism and knowledge attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52, 913–929.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. DeRose, K. (1995). Solving the skeptical problem. Philosophical Review, 104, 1–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. DeRose, K. (2005). The ordinary language basis for contextualism and the new invariantism. Philosophical Quarterly, 55, 172–198.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. DeRose, K. (2007). Review of stanley (2005). Mind, 116, 486–489.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. DeRose, K. (2009). The case for contextualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Doris, J. M., Knobe, J., & Woolfolk, R. L. (2007). Variantism about responsibility. Philosophical Perspectives, 21, 183–214.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Dretske, F. I. (1972). Contrastive statements. Philosophical Review, 81, 411–437.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Feltz, A., & Zarpentine, C. Do you know more when it matters less?” Philosophical Psychology, (forthcoming).Google Scholar
  13. Goldman, A., & Pust, J. (1998). Philosophical theory and intuitional evidence. In W. Ramsey & M. DePaul (Eds.), Rethinking intuition. Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
  14. Lewis, D. (1979). Scorekeeping in a language game. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8, 339–359.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. May, J., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Hull, J. G., & Zimmerman, A. Practical interests, relevant alternatives, and knowledge attributions: An empirical study. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, (forthcoming).Google Scholar
  16. Neta, R., & Phelan, M. (manuscript). Evidence that stakes don’t matter for evidence.Google Scholar
  17. Schaffer, J., & Knobe, J. “Contrastivism surveyed,” Noûs. Page references are to the prepublication draft available on Knobe’s web site, accessed 6 January 2011, (forthcoming).Google Scholar
  18. Schwarz, N. (1995). What respondents learn from questionnaires: The survey interview and the logic of conversation. International Statistical Review/Revue Internationale de Statistique, 63, 153–168.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Schwarz, N. (1996). Cognition and communication: Judgmental biases, research methods, and the logic of conversation. Erlbaum: Mahwah.Google Scholar
  20. Schwarz, N., Fritz, S., & Hans-Peter, M. (1991). Assimilation and contrast effects in part-whole question sequences: A conversational logic analysis. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 55, 3–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Stanley, J. (2005). Knowledge and practical interests. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Yale UniversityNew HavenUSA

Personalised recommendations