Philosophical Studies

, Volume 163, Issue 1, pp 151–170 | Cite as

On behalf of the consequence argument: time, modality, and the nature of free action

Article
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Abstract

The consequence argument for the incompatibility of free action and determinism has long been under attack, but two important objections have only recently emerged: Warfield’s modal fallacy objection and Campbell’s no past objection. In this paper, I explain the significance of these objections and defend the consequence argument against them. First, I present a novel formulation of the argument that withstands their force. Next, I argue for the one controversial claim on which this formulation relies: the trans-temporality thesis. This thesis implies that an agent acts freely only if there is one time at which she is able to perform an action and a distinct time at which she actually performs it. I then point out that determinism, too, is a thesis about trans-temporal relations. I conclude that it is precisely because my formulation of the consequence argument emphasizes trans-temporality that it prevails against the modal fallacy and no past objections.

Keywords

Free will Free action Consequence argument Incompatibilism No past objection Accidental possibility 
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Notes

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Andrew Bailey, David Buller, Mary Beth Finch, Jennifer Lackey, Geoff Pynn, Baron Reed, Mike Rea, and Kevin Timpe for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to Jonah Nagashima for valuable discussion of the topic and to Aaron Schroeder for his assistance in editing the manuscript.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyNorthern Illinois UniversityDekalbUSA

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