Philosophical Studies

, Volume 159, Issue 3, pp 457–465 | Cite as

Subjective consciousness and self-representation



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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophySyracuse UniversitySyracuseUSA

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