Philosophical Studies

, Volume 162, Issue 2, pp 257–273 | Cite as




This paper presents an ‘over-representational’ account of blurred visual experiences. The basic idea is that blurred experiences provide too much, inconsistent, information about objects’ spatial boundaries, by representing them as simultaneously located at multiple locations. This account attempts to avoid problems with alternative accounts of blurred experience, according to which blur is a property of a visual field, a way of perceiving, a form of mis-representation, and a form of under-representation.


Blurred vision Perception Transparency Intentionalism Representationalism 



A version of this paper was presented at a conference to celebrate Tim Crane’s time at UCL. I hope it is evident that I owe a special debt of thanks to Tim Crane. I would also like to thank the audience at UCL for their comments and questions, and particularly Colin Johnston, Gabriel Lakeman, Rory Madden, Michael Martin, and Matt Nudds. Thanks, too, to Bob Clark, Matthew Conduct, Tom Stoneham, and Rachael Wiseman.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of YorkYorkUK

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