Philosophical Studies

, Volume 154, Issue 1, pp 79–104 | Cite as

Construction area (no hard hat required)

Article

Abstract

A variety of relations widely invoked by philosophers—composition, constitution, realization, micro-basing, emergence, and many others—are species of what I call ‘building relations’. I argue that they are conceptually intertwined, articulate what it takes for a relation to count as a building relation, and argue that—contra appearances—it is an open possibility that these relations are all determinates of a common determinable, or even that there is really only one building relation.

Keywords

Composition Constitution Supervenience Grounding Dependence Fundamentality 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Sage School of PhilosophyCornell UniversityIthacaUSA

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