Philosophical Studies

, Volume 154, Issue 1, pp 53–78 | Cite as

Is there a fact of the matter between direct reference theory and (neo-)Fregeanism?

Article

Abstract

It is argued here that there is no fact of the matter between direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism. To get a more precise idea of the central thesis of this paper, consider the following two claims: (i) While direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism can be developed in numerous ways, they can be developed in essentially parallel ways; that is, for any (plausible) way of developing direct reference theory, there is an essentially parallel way of developing neo-Fregeanism, and vice versa. And (ii) for each such pair of theories, there is no fact of the matter as to which of them is superior; or more precisely, they are tied in terms of factual accuracy. These are sweeping claims that cannot be fully justified in a single paper. But arguments are given here that motivate these theses, i.e., that suggest that they are very likely true.

Keywords

Direct reference theory Neo-Fregeanism Factual emptiness Facts of the matter Belief reports Propositions 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Stephen Schiffer, David Pitt, Ed Becker, and Liz Harman for commenting on earlier versions of this paper.

References

  1. Balaguer, M. (2005). Indexical propositions and De Re belief ascriptions. Synthese, 146, 325–355.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Burge, T. (1973). Reference and proper names. Journal of Philosophy, 70, 425–439.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Crimmins, M., & Perry, J. (1989). The prince and the phone booth. Journal of Philosophy, 86, 685–711.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Forbes, G. (1987). Indexicals and intensionality: a Fregean perspective. The Philosophical Review, 96, 3–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Frege, G. (1892). On sense and nominatum. (Reprinted from The philosophy of language, 4th edn, by A. P. Martinich, Ed., New York: Oxford University Press) (H. Feigl, Trans).Google Scholar
  6. Frege G. (1919). The thought: a logical inquiry. (Reprinted from Essays on Frege, pp. 507–35, by E. D. Klemke, Ed., 1968, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press (A. M. & M. Quinton, Trans).Google Scholar
  7. Higginbotham, J. (1995). Tensed thoughts. Mind and Language, 10, 226–249.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Kaplan, D. (1968–1969). Quantifying in. Synthese, 19, 178–214.Google Scholar
  9. Kaplan, D. (1989). Demonstratives. In J. Almog, J. Perry, & H. Wettstein (Eds.), Themes from Kaplan (pp. 481–563). New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  10. Katz, J. (1990). Has the description theory of names been refuted? In G. Boolos (Ed.), Meaning and method: essays in honor of Hilary Putnam (pp. 31–61). New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  11. Kripke, S. (1972). Naming and necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  12. Perry, J. (1979). The problem of the essential indexical. Nous, 13, 3–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Recanati, F. (1993). Direct reference. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  14. Richard, M. (1990). Propositional attitudes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Salmon, N. (1986). Frege’s puzzle. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  16. Salmon, N. (2002). Demonstrating and necessity. The Philosophical Review, 111, 497–537.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Schiffer, S. (1977). Naming and knowing. In P. French, T. Uehling, & H. Wettstein (Eds.), Midwest studies in philosophy II (pp. 28–41). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
  18. Schiffer, S. (1978). The basis of reference. Erkenntnis, 13, 171–206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyCalifornia State University, Los AngelesLos AngelesUSA

Personalised recommendations