Philosophical Studies

, Volume 156, Issue 3, pp 421–431 | Cite as

Relativistic content and disagreement




Thanks to Nancy Bauer for comments and to a seminar on contemporary relativism at Tufts in Fall 2009 for spirited discussion.


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Copyright information

© All rights reserved 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy Department, Emerson HallHarvard UniversityCambridgeUSA

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