Philosophical Studies

, Volume 158, Issue 3, pp 401–413 | Cite as

Propositions, semantic values, and rigidity

  • Dilip NinanEmail author


Jeffrey King has recently argued: (i) that the semantic value of a sentence at a context is (or determines) a function from possible worlds to truth values, and (ii) that this undermines Jason Stanley's argument against the rigidity thesis, the claim that no rigid term has the same content as a non-rigid term. I show that King's main argument for (i) fails, and that Stanley's argument is consistent with the claim that the semantic value of a sentence at a context is (or determines) a function from worlds to truth values.


Propositions Operators Quantifiers Tense Modality Rigidity Two-dimensionalism 



For helpful comments, thanks to Alejandro Pérez Carballo, Paolo Santorio, Seth Yalcin, and an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Arché Philosophical Research CentreUniversity of St AndrewsSt AndrewsUK

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