Philosophical Studies

, Volume 157, Issue 3, pp 361–382 | Cite as

Resemblance theories of properties

  • Alexander Paseau


The paper aims to develop a resemblance theory of properties that technically improves on past versions. The theory is based on a comparative resemblance predicate. In combination with other resources, it solves the various technical problems besetting resemblance nominalism. The paper’s second main aim is to indicate that previously proposed resemblance theories that solve the technical problems, including the comparative theory, are nominalistically unacceptable and have controversial philosophical commitments.


Resemblance nominalism Properties Comparative resemblance predicate Coextension problem Imperfect community problem Companionship problem Mere intersections problem 



Thanks to Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, journal referees, and members of the Sheffield Philosophy department, especially Dominic Gregory, for comments.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Wadham CollegeOxford UniversityOxfordUK

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