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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 155, Issue 3, pp 445–456 | Cite as

Stalnaker on sleeping beauty

  • Brian WeathersonEmail author
Article
The Sleeping Beauty puzzle provides a nice illustration of the approach to self-locating belief defended by Robert Stalnaker in Our Knowledge of the Internal World ( 2008), as well as a test of the utility of that method. The setup of the Sleeping Beauty puzzle is by now fairly familiar. On Sunday Sleeping Beauty is told the rules of the game, and a (known to be) fair coin is flipped. On Monday, Sleeping Beauty is woken, and then put back to sleep. If, and only if, the coin landed tails, she is woken again on Tuesday after having her memory of the Monday awakening erased. 1 On Wednesday she is woken again and the game ends. There are a few questions we can ask about Beauty’s attitudes as the game progresses. We’d like to know what her credence that the coin landed heads should be
  1. (a)

    Before she goes to sleep Sunday;

     
  2. (b)

    When she wakes on Monday;

     
  3. (c)

    When she wakes on Tuesday; and

     
  4. (d)

    When she wakes on Wednesday?

     
Standard treatments of the Sleeping Beauty puzzle ignore (d), run...

Keywords

Credence Function Fire Extinguisher Singular Proposition Centered World Singular Thought 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgment

Thanks to Adam Elga, Elizabeth Harman, Ishani Maitra, Ted Sider, Robert Stanlaker and Seth Yelcin for comments on an earlier, and mistake-riddled, draft.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyRutgers, The State University of New JerseyNew BrunswickUSA

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