I am grateful to Jason Stanley and Philippe Schlenker for their careful exposition and penetrating criticisms of my work on intentionality, assertion and presupposition. I have learned a lot from both of them—from these papers as well as others, and from discussion over the years since each was a graduate student at MIT. Some of their points have led me to modify my views; others have shown the need for elaboration and clarification, which I will try to provide. I will begin with Stanley’s discussion of my general project, and then look at more specific issues, discussed by both Stanley and Schlenker, about the model of discourse that I have defended.
The problem of intentionality
Stanley characterizes my causal-pragmatic approach to the problem of intentionality as a version of “what is often called informational semantics”, which has as a goal “to provide a reduction of content bearing states to purely naturalistic notions by analyzing them as involving law-like, causal relations...
KeywordsActual World Epistemic Possibility Singular Proposition Attitude Attribution Presupposition Projection
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