Philosophical Studies

, Volume 155, Issue 3, pp 383–398 | Cite as

Quantifiers and epistemic contextualism

Article

Abstract

I defend a neo-Lewisean form of contextualism about knowledge attributions. Understanding the context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions in terms of the context-sensitivity of universal quantifiers provides an appealing approach to knowledge. Among the virtues of this approach are solutions to the skeptical paradox and the Gettier problem. I respond to influential objections to Lewis’s account.

Keywords

Knowledge Epistemology Contextualism The Gettier problem Skepticism The skeptical paradox Quantifiers David Lewis 

Notes

Acknowledgments

For valuable conversations, and for and comments on previous drafts of this project, I am grateful to Jessica Brown, Yuri Cath, Stewart Cohen, Paul Dimmock, Benjamin Jarvis, Carrie Jenkins, Ernest Sosa, Jason Stanley, Brian Weatherson, and Crispin Wright.

References

  1. Cappelen, H., & Lepore, E. (2005). Insensitive semantics. Malden, MA: Blackwell Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Cohen, S. (1998). Contextualist solutions to epistemological problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the lottery. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76(2), 289–306.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. DeRose, K. (1995). Solving the skeptical problem. The Philosophical Review, 104(1), 1–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Gendler, T., & Hawthorne, J. (2005). The real guide to fake barns: A catalogue of gifts for your epistemic enemies. Philosophical Studies, 124(3), 331–352.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Hawthorne, J. (2004). Knowledge and lotteries. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  6. Klein, P. (2007). Human knowledge and the infinite progress of reasoning. Philosophical Studies, 134(1), 1–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Lewis, D. K. (1996). Elusive knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74(4), 549–567. (Reprinted from Papers in metaphysics and epistemology, pp. 418–445, by D. Lewis, Ed., 1999, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  8. Oakley, I. T. (2001). A skeptic’s reply to Lewisian contextualism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 31(3), 309–332.Google Scholar
  9. Stanley, J. (2005). Knowledge and practical interests. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Stanley, J., & Szabó, Z. (2003). On quantifier domain restriction. Mind & Language, 15(2), 219–261.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Williamson, T. (2002). Knowledge and its limits. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Arché Philosophical Research CentreUniversity of St. AndrewsSt. Andrews, FifeScotland, UK

Personalised recommendations