Quantifiers and epistemic contextualism
I defend a neo-Lewisean form of contextualism about knowledge attributions. Understanding the context-sensitivity of knowledge attributions in terms of the context-sensitivity of universal quantifiers provides an appealing approach to knowledge. Among the virtues of this approach are solutions to the skeptical paradox and the Gettier problem. I respond to influential objections to Lewis’s account.
KeywordsKnowledge Epistemology Contextualism The Gettier problem Skepticism The skeptical paradox Quantifiers David Lewis
For valuable conversations, and for and comments on previous drafts of this project, I am grateful to Jessica Brown, Yuri Cath, Stewart Cohen, Paul Dimmock, Benjamin Jarvis, Carrie Jenkins, Ernest Sosa, Jason Stanley, Brian Weatherson, and Crispin Wright.
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