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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 149, Issue 1, pp 49–71 | Cite as

Binding and its consequences

  • Christopher J. G. Meacham
Article

Abstract

In “Bayesianism, Infinite Decisions, and Binding”, Arntzenius et al. (Mind 113:251–283, 2004) present cases in which agents who cannot bind themselves are driven by standard decision theory to choose sequences of actions with disastrous consequences. They defend standard decision theory by arguing that if a decision rule leads agents to disaster only when they cannot bind themselves, this should not be taken to be a mark against the decision rule. I show that this claim has surprising implications for a number of other debates in decision theory. I then assess the plausibility of this claim, and suggest that it should be rejected.

Keywords

Decision theory Binding Causal Evidential Decision instability 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I would like thank Frank Arntzenius, Philip Bricker, Maya Eddon, Adam Elga, David Etlin, Barry Lam, Ted Sider, Dennis Whitcomb, participants of the Second Formal Epistemology Festival, and participants of the Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, for helpful comments and discussion.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, 352 Bartlett HallUniversity of MassachusettsAmherstUSA

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