Philosophical Studies

, Volume 155, Issue 1, pp 37–43

Independence accounts of substance and substantial parts

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-010-9521-4

Cite this article as:
Toner, P. Philos Stud (2011) 155: 37. doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9521-4

Abstract

Traditionally, independence accounts of substance have held pride of place. Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes and Spinoza—among many others—accepted independence accounts in one form or another. The general thrust of such views is that substances are those things that are apt to exist in themselves. In this paper, I argue that several contemporary independence theories of substance—including those of Kit Fine, E.J. Lowe and Michael Gorman—include an ad hoc element that renders them unacceptable. I’ll also consider the theories of Hoffman and Rosenkrantz.

Keywords

Substance Ontology Parthood 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyWake Forest UniversityWinston SalemUSA

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