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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 153, Issue 3, pp 417–434 | Cite as

The logic of ‘being informed’ revisited and revised

  • Patrick Allo
Article

Abstract

The logic of ‘being informed’ gives a formal analysis of a cognitive state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge. To Floridi, who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being informed is a factive, but not a reflective state. This paper takes a closer look at the formal analysis itself, provides a pure and an applied semantics for the logic of being informed, and tries to find out to what extent the formal analysis can contribute to an information-based epistemology.

Keywords

Epistemic logic Information Knowledge 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation (FWO)FlandersBelgium
  2. 2.CLWFVrije Universiteit BrusselBrusselsBelgium
  3. 3.IEGOxford UniversityOxfordUK
  4. 4.GPIUniversity of HertfordshireHatfieldUK

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