Philosophical Studies

, Volume 153, Issue 3, pp 365–375 | Cite as

Realizing what might be

  • Malte WillerEmail author


Schulz has shown that the suppositional view of indicative conditionals leads to a corresponding view of epistemic modals. But his case backfires: the resulting theory of epistemic modals gets the facts wrong, and so we end up with a good argument against the suppositional view. I show how and why a dynamic view of indicative conditionals leads to a better theory of epistemic modals.


Epistemic modals Indicative conditionals Dynamic semantics Suppositional view 



For comments, I would like to thank Nicholas Asher, Josh Dever, Hans Kamp, Mark Sainsbury, and an anonymous Philosophical Studies referee.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentUniversity of Texas at AustinAustinUSA

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