Philosophical Studies

, Volume 153, Issue 2, pp 307–311 | Cite as

A paradox for supertask decision makers



I consider two puzzles in which an agent undergoes a sequence of decision problems. In both cases it is possible to respond rationally to any given problem yet it is impossible to respond rationally to every problem in the sequence, even though the choices are independent. In particular, although it might be a requirement of rationality that one must respond in a certain way at each point in the sequence, it seems it cannot be a requirement to respond as such at every point for that would be to require the impossible.


Supertask Infinite decision puzzle Rationality Deontic Barcan formula 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.New College, Oxford UniversityOxfordUK

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