Philosophical Studies

, Volume 152, Issue 3, pp 335–345 | Cite as

The A-theory of time and induction

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Abstract

The A-theory of time says that it is an objective, non-perspectival fact about the world that some events are present, while others were present or will be present. I shall argue that the A-theory has some implausible consequences for inductive reasoning. In particular, the presentist version of the A-theory, which holds that the difference between the present and the non-present consists in the present events being the only ones that exist, is very much in trouble.

Keywords

Time A-theory Presentism Induction 

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyBaylor UniversityWacoUSA

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