Philosophical Studies

, Volume 151, Issue 3, pp 421–432 | Cite as

The buck-passing account of value: lessons from Crisp

  • S. Matthew Liao


T. M. Scanlon’s buck-passing account of value (BPA) has been subjected to a barrage of criticisms. Recently, to be helpful to BPA, Roger Crisp has suggested that a number of these criticisms can be met if one makes some revisions to BPA. In this paper, I argue that if advocates of the buck-passing account accepted these revisions, they would effectively be giving up the buck-passing account as it is typically understood, that is, as an account concerned with the conceptual priority of reasons or the right vis-à-vis value or the good. I conclude by addressing some of the broader implications of my arguments for the current debate about the buck-passing account of value.


Buck-passing account of value Roger Crisp Reasons and value T. M. Scanlon 



I would like to thank Roger Crisp, Andrew Reisner, Guy Kahane, Jonas Olson, Jens Johansson, Pekka Väyrynen, Gerald Lang, Jussi Suikkanen, Krister Bykvist, Tom Hurka, Adam Swenson, Wibke Gruetjen, an anonymous reviewer at Philosophical Studies, and the audiences at the 2009 American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting in Vancouver for their very helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of PhilosophyOxford UniversityOxfordUK

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