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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 152, Issue 1, pp 17–39 | Cite as

Gupta’s gambit

Article

Abstract

After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book Empiricism and Experience, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.

Keywords

Gupta Empiricism The given Experience Entitlement Interdependence 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyHarvard UniversityCambridgeUSA

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