Philosophical Studies

, Volume 151, Issue 1, pp 79–86 | Cite as

Reasons, impossibility and efficient steps: reply to Heuer

  • Bart Streumer


Ulrike Heuer argues that there can be a reason for a person to perform an action that this person cannot perform, as long as this person can take efficient steps towards performing this action. In this reply, I first argue that Heuer’s examples fail to undermine my claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person will perform this action. I then argue that, on a plausible interpretation of what ‘efficient steps’ are, Heuer’s claim is consistent with my claim. I end by showing that Heuer fails to undermine the arguments I gave for my claim.


Reasons for action Impossibility 



I would like to thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments on earlier versions of this reply.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of ReadingReadingUK

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