Philosophical Studies

, Volume 145, Issue 3, pp 465–476 | Cite as

Replies to Ichikawa, Martin and Weinberg



Thought Experiment Major Premise Gettier Case Experimental Philosopher Justify True Belief 



The author thanks the three commentators for their interesting questions, and to all the participants at the Arché workshop in St Andrews which led to this symposium for discussion, including Stephen Stich, who coauthored the paper with Jonathan Weinberg as presented there.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.New CollegeOxfordU.K.

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