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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 145, Issue 3, pp 465–476 | Cite as

Replies to Ichikawa, Martin and Weinberg

  • Timothy Williamson
Article

Reply to Ichikawa

The Philosophy of Philosophy analyses the Gettier thought experiment as an argument whose major premise is a counterfactual conditional. In ‘Knowing the Intuition and Knowing the Counterfactual’, Jonathan Ichikawa objects that this misrepresents the thought experiment as more accident-prone than it really is. If the world does not cooperate, the counterfactual will fail: it will be false that if the Gettier text had been realized, there would have been justified true belief without knowledge. Even if the world cooperates enough to make the counterfactual true, it may still not cooperate enough to enable us to know it, if it could too easily have been false. Ichikawa denies that the thought experiment is such a hostage to empirical fortune. The Philosophy of Philosophyconsiders such objections, arguing that although the thought experiment is indeed not immune to misfortune, that should not drive us to scepticism. If we identify an unwanted way in which the Gettier...

Keywords

Thought Experiment Major Premise Gettier Case Experimental Philosopher Justify True Belief 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgement

The author thanks the three commentators for their interesting questions, and to all the participants at the Arché workshop in St Andrews which led to this symposium for discussion, including Stephen Stich, who coauthored the paper with Jonathan Weinberg as presented there.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.New CollegeOxfordU.K.

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