Knowing the intuition and knowing the counterfactual
I criticize Timothy Williamson’s characterization of thought experiments on which the central judgments are judgments of contingent counterfactuals. The fragility of these counterfactuals makes them too easily false, and too difficult to know.
KeywordsThought experiments Intuition Timothy Williamson
- Bealer, G. (1997). Intuition and the autonomy of philosophy. In M. DePaul & W. Ramsey (Eds.), Rethinking intuition. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
- Sosa, E. (1997). Minimal intuition. In M. DePaul & W. Ramsey (Eds.), Rethinking intuition. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
- Wright, C. (1983). Frege’s conception of numbers as objects. Aberdeen, Scotland: Aberdeen University Press.Google Scholar
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009