Philosophical Studies

, Volume 145, Issue 3, pp 435–443 | Cite as

Knowing the intuition and knowing the counterfactual

Article

Abstract

I criticize Timothy Williamson’s characterization of thought experiments on which the central judgments are judgments of contingent counterfactuals. The fragility of these counterfactuals makes them too easily false, and too difficult to know.

Keywords

Thought experiments Intuition Timothy Williamson 

References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Arché Philosophical Research CentreThe University of St. AndrewsSt. Andrews, FifeScotland, UK

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