Philosophical Studies

, Volume 150, Issue 1, pp 97–114

Centered assertion

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-009-9399-1

Cite this article as:
Torre, S. Philos Stud (2010) 150: 97. doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9399-1

Abstract

I suggest a way of extending Stalnaker’s account of assertion to allow for centered content. In formulating his account, Stalnaker takes the content of assertion to be uncentered propositions: entities that are evaluated for truth at a possible world. I argue that the content of assertion is sometimes centered: the content is evaluated for truth at something within a possible world. I consider Andy Egan’s proposal for extending Stalnaker’s account to allow for assertions with centered content. I argue that Egan’s account does not succeed. Instead, I propose an account on which the contents of assertion are identified with sets of multi-centered worlds. I argue that such a view not only provides a plausible account of how assertions can have centered content, but also preserves Stalnaker’s original insight that successful assertion involves the reduction of shared possibilities.

Keywords

Assertion Content Centered worlds Self-locating 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Oriel CollegeUniversity of OxfordOxfordUK

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