Philosophical Studies

, Volume 145, Issue 1, pp 131–148 | Cite as

Spacetime the one substance

Article

Abstract

What is the relation between material objects and spacetime regions? Supposing that spacetime regions are one sort of substance, there remains the question of whether or not material objects are a second sort of substance. This is the question of dualistic versus monisticsubstantivalism. I will defend the monistic view. In particular, I will maintain that material objects should be identified with spacetime regions. There is the spacetime manifold, and the fundamental properties are pinned directly to it.

Keywords

Spacetime Substantivalism Supersubstantivalism Monism 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy RSSSAustralian National UniversityCanberraAustralia

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