Philosophical Studies

, Volume 144, Issue 1, pp 45–62 | Cite as

Revisionism about free will: a statement & defense

  • Manuel VargasEmail author


This article summarizes and extends the moderate revisionist position I put forth in Four Views on Free Will and responds to objections to it from Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Derk Pereboom, and Michael McKenna. Among the principle topics of the article are (1) motivations for revisionism, what it is, and how it is different from compatibilism and hard incompatibilism, (2) an objection to libertarianism based on the moral costs of its current epistemic status, (3) an objection to the distinctiveness of semicompatibilism against conventional forms of compatibilism, and (4) whether moderate revisionism is committed to realism about moral responsibility.


Free will Moral responsibility Revisionism Compatibilism Libertarianism Hard incompatibilism 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentUniversity of San FranciscoSan FranciscoUSA

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