Philosophical Studies

, Volume 149, Issue 3, pp 321–326

Disagreement, equal weight and commutativity


DOI: 10.1007/s11098-009-9362-1

Cite this article as:
Wilson, A. Philos Stud (2010) 149: 321. doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9362-1


How should we respond to cases of disagreement where two epistemic agents have the same evidence but come to different conclusions? Adam Elga has provided a Bayesian framework for addressing this question. In this paper, I shall highlight two unfortunate consequences of this framework, which Elga does not anticipate. Both problems derive from a failure of commutativity between application of the equal weight view and updating in the light of other evidence.


Disagreement Equal weight view Commutativity Averaging Credences Evidence Epistemic peer 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University CollegeUniversity of OxfordOxfordUK

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