Philosophical Studies

, Volume 149, Issue 2, pp 153–160 | Cite as

Opposing powers

Article

Abstract

A disposition mask is something that prevents a disposition from manifesting despite the occurrence of that disposition’s characteristic stimulus, and without eliminating that disposition. Several authors have maintained that masks must be things extrinsic to the objects that have the masked dispositions. Here it is argued that this is not so; masks can be intrinsic to the objects whose dispositions they mask. If that is correct, then a recent attempt to distinguish dispositional properties from so-called categorical properties fails.

Keywords

Categorical properties Dispositions Finks Masks 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I’m grateful to Michael Fara, John Heil, and an anonymous referee for this journal for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

References

  1. Austin, J. L. (1979). Ifs and cans. In Philosophical papers (3rd ed., pp. 205–232). Oxford: Clarendon PressGoogle Scholar
  2. Bird, A. (1998). Dispositions and antidotes. The Philosophical Quarterly, 48, 227–234. doi: 10.1111/1467-9213.00098.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Choi, S. (2005). Do categorical ascriptions entail counterfactual conditionals? The Philosophical Quarterly, 55, 495–503. doi: 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00413.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Clarke, R. (2008). Intrinsic finks. The Philosophical Quarterly, 58, 512–518.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Clarke, R. (forthcoming). Dispositions, abilities to act, and free will: The new dispositionalism. Mind.Google Scholar
  6. Cohen, D., & Handfield, T. (2007). Finking Frankfurt. Philosophical Studies, 135, 363–374. doi: 10.1007/s11098-005-5732-5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Fara, M. (2005). Dispositions and habituals. Nous, 39, 43–82. doi: 10.1111/j.0029-4624.2005.00493.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Fara, M. (2008). Masked abilities and compatibilism. Mind, 117, 843–865. doi: 10.1093/mind/fzn078.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Handfield, T. (2008). Unfinkable dispositions. Synthese, 160, 297–308. doi: 10.1007/s11229-006-9148-3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Handfield, T., & Bird, A. (2008). Dispositions, rules, and finks. Philosophical Studies, 140, 285–298. doi: 10.1007/s11098-007-9148-2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Johnston, M. (1992). How to speak of the colors. Philosophical Studies, 68, 221–263. doi: 10.1007/BF00694847.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Lewis, D. (1997). Finkish dispositions. The Philosophical Quarterly, 47, 143–158. doi: 10.1111/1467-9213.00052.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Martin, C. B. (1994). Dispositions and conditionals. The Philosophical Quarterly, 44, 1–8. doi: 10.2307/2220143.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Mumford, S. (1998). Dispositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyFlorida State UniversityTallahasseeUSA

Personalised recommendations