A disposition mask is something that prevents a disposition from manifesting despite the occurrence of that disposition’s characteristic stimulus, and without eliminating that disposition. Several authors have maintained that masks must be things extrinsic to the objects that have the masked dispositions. Here it is argued that this is not so; masks can be intrinsic to the objects whose dispositions they mask. If that is correct, then a recent attempt to distinguish dispositional properties from so-called categorical properties fails.
KeywordsCategorical properties Dispositions Finks Masks
I’m grateful to Michael Fara, John Heil, and an anonymous referee for this journal for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
- Austin, J. L. (1979). Ifs and cans. In Philosophical papers (3rd ed., pp. 205–232). Oxford: Clarendon PressGoogle Scholar
- Clarke, R. (forthcoming). Dispositions, abilities to act, and free will: The new dispositionalism. Mind.Google Scholar
- Mumford, S. (1998). Dispositions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar