Philosophical Studies

, Volume 142, Issue 1, pp 27–42 | Cite as

Knowledge and credit

Article

Abstract

A widely accepted view in recent work in epistemology is that knowledge is a cognitive achievement that is properly creditable to those subjects who possess it. More precisely, according to the Credit View of Knowledge, if S knows that p, then S deserves credit for truly believing that p. In spite of its intuitive appeal and explanatory power, I have elsewhere argued that the Credit View is false. Various responses have been offered to my argument and I here consider each of these objections in turn. I show that none succeeds in undermining my argument and, thus, my original conclusion stands—the Credit View of Knowledge is false.

Keywords

Knowledge Credit Credit View of Knowledge Testimony Gettier cases 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Northwestern UniversityEvanstonUSA

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