Philosophical Studies

, Volume 142, Issue 1, pp 27–42

Knowledge and credit

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-008-9304-3

Cite this article as:
Lackey, J. Philos Stud (2009) 142: 27. doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9304-3

Abstract

A widely accepted view in recent work in epistemology is that knowledge is a cognitive achievement that is properly creditable to those subjects who possess it. More precisely, according to the Credit View of Knowledge, if S knows that p, then S deserves credit for truly believing that p. In spite of its intuitive appeal and explanatory power, I have elsewhere argued that the Credit View is false. Various responses have been offered to my argument and I here consider each of these objections in turn. I show that none succeeds in undermining my argument and, thus, my original conclusion stands—the Credit View of Knowledge is false.

Keywords

Knowledge Credit Credit View of Knowledge Testimony Gettier cases 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Northwestern UniversityEvanstonUSA

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