Boghossian, Bellarmine, and Bayes
(Equal Validity) There are many radically different, yet ‘equally valid’ ways of knowing the world, with science being just one of them (2).1
Boghossian suggests two sources for the continuing appeal of this view. The first is a postcolonial unwillingness to criticize cultures as inferior. Here, he notes, Equal Validity is a two-edged sword: “for if the powerful can’t criticize the oppressed, because the central epistemological categories are inexorably tied to particular perspectives, it also follows that the oppressed can’t criticize the powerful” (130). But in addition to its political...
KeywordsPrima Facie Justify Belief Background Belief Epistemic Relativism Epistemic Principle
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