Philosophical Studies

, Volume 142, Issue 2, pp 161–181 | Cite as

Moral responsibility and agents’ histories

Article

Abstract

To what extent should an analysis of an agent’s being morally responsible for an action that he performed—especially a compatibilist analysis of this—be sensitive to the agent’s history? In this article, I give the issue a clearer focus than it tends to have in the literature, I lay some groundwork for an attempt to answer the question, and I motivate a partial but detailed answer.

Keywords

Alternative possibilities Agents’ histories Character Compatibilism Manipulation Moral responsibility 

Notes

Acknowledgements

For comments on a draft of this paper or discussion of some of the ideas in it, I am grateful to Randy Clarke, Neil Levy, Michael McKenna, and an anonymous referee.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyFlorida State UniversityTallahasseeUSA

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