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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 137, Issue 1, pp 41–64 | Cite as

Kantian non-conceptualism

  • Robert Hanna
Article

Abstract

There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true, then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all the way down into so-called unconscious or subpersonal mental states. Both my argument for the existence of essentially non-conceptual content and my theory of its structure and function have a Kantian provenance.

Keywords

Non-conceptual mental content Spatial representation Concepts Consciousness Kant 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to Monima Chadha, Philippe Chuard, Andy Clark, James Genone, Jeff Speaks, and also to audiences at the APA Pacific Division Meetings in San Francisco, in April 07, the University of Edinburgh, Monash University (Australia), University of Oxford, and the University of Tampere (Finland) for conversations and critical comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.PhilosophyUniversity of Colorado at BoulderBoulderUSA

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