Philosophical Studies

, Volume 140, Issue 2, pp 247–262 | Cite as

A defense of intuitions

Article

Abstract

Radical experimentalists argue that we should give up using intuitions as evidence in philosophy. In this paper, I first argue that the studies presented by the radical experimentalists in fact suggest that some intuitions are reliable. I next consider and reject a different way of handling the radical experimentalists’ challenge, what I call the Argument from Robust Intuitions. I then propose a way of understanding why some intuitions can be unreliable and how intuitions can conflict, and I argue that on this understanding, both moderate experimentalism and the standard philosophical practice of using intuitions as evidence can help resolve these conflicts.

Keywords

Intuitions Experimental philosophy Experimentalism Intuitionism Empirical psychology 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of PhilosophyOxford UniversityOxfordUK

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