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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 140, Issue 2, pp 229–246 | Cite as

Brogaard and Salerno on antirealism and the conditional fallacy

  • Luca Moretti
Original Paper

Abstract

Brogaard and Salerno (2005, Nous, 39, 123–139) have argued that antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth is flawed because it commits a conditional fallacy by entailing the absurdity that there is necessarily an epistemic agent. Brogaard and Salerno’s argument relies on a formal proof built upon the criticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga (1982, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 56, 47–70) and Rea (2000, Nous, 34, 291–301). If this argument were conclusive, antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth should probably be abandoned. I argue however that the antirealist is not committed to a controversial reading of counterfactuals presupposed in Brogaard and Salerno’s proof, and that the antirealist can in principle adopt an alternative reading that makes this proof invalid. My conclusion is that no reductio of antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth has yet been provided.

Keywords

Antirealism Conditional fallacy Brogaard Salerno Counterfactuals Counterpossibles Truth Epistemic truth Realism/antirealism debate Prantinga Rea Wright Intuitionistic logic Intuitionistic modal logic Lewis Semantic antirealism Alethic antirealism Combinatorialism Nathan Salmon Armstrong 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to Nicola Ciprotti, John Divers, Michael Gabbay, Uriah Kriegel, Jonathan Kvanvig, Julien Murzi, Valeria de Paiva, Tommaso Piazza, Alex K. Simpson, Nicholas J.J. Smith and a referee of this Journal for valuable discussions and important criticisms upon previous versions of this paper. A special thank to Arif Ahmed and Berit Brogaard.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Time, Department of PhilosophyUniversity of SydneySydneyAustralia

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