Philosophical Studies

, Volume 139, Issue 2, pp 171–180 | Cite as

Williamson on inexact knowledge

Article
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Abstract

Timothy Williamson claims that margin for error principles govern all cases of inexact knowledge. I show that this claim is unfounded: there are cases of inexact knowledge where Williamson’s argument for margin for error principles does not go through. The problematic cases are those where the value of the relevant parameter is fixed across close cases. I explore and reject two responses to my objection, before concluding that Williamson’s account of inexact knowledge is not compelling.

Keywords

Vagueness Inexact knowledge Epistemic theory Williamson Margin for error Reliabilism 

References

  1. Keefe, R. (2000). Theories of Vagueness, CUP.Google Scholar
  2. Sainsbury, M. (1997). Easy possibilities in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57.Google Scholar
  3. Williamson, T. (1994). Vagueness. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  4. Williamson, T. (1996). Wright on the epistemic conception of vagueness in Analysis 56.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.RedhillUK

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