Philosophical Studies

, Volume 139, Issue 1, pp 91–110

Serious metaphysics and the vindication of reductions


DOI: 10.1007/s11098-007-9104-1

Cite this article as:
Dowell, J. Philos Stud (2008) 139: 91. doi:10.1007/s11098-007-9104-1


What would be sufficient to show of some apparently higher-level property that it is ‘nothing over and above’ some complex configuration of more basic properties? This paper defends a new method for justifying reductions by demonstrating its comparative advantages over two methods recently defended in the literature. Unlike its rivals, what I’ll call “the semantic method” makes a reduction’s truth epistemically transparent without relying on conceptual analyses.


Physicalism Dualism Reduction Conceptual analysis Inference to the best explanation 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyLincolnUSA

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