Advertisement

Philosophical Studies

, Volume 136, Issue 2, pp 167–216 | Cite as

I OUGHT, THEREFORE I CAN

  • Peter B. M. VranasEmail author
Article

Abstract

I defend the following version of the ought-implies-can principle: (OIC) by virtue of conceptual necessity, an agent at a given time has an (objective, pro tanto) obligation to do only what the agent at that time has the ability and opportunity to do. In short, obligations correspond to ability plus opportunity. My argument has three premises: (1) obligations correspond to reasons for action; (2) reasons for action correspond to potential actions; (3) potential actions correspond to ability plus opportunity. In the bulk of the paper I address six objections to OIC: three objections based on putative counterexamples, and three objections based on arguments to the effect that OIC conflicts with the is/ought thesis, the possibility of hard determinism, and the denial of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities.

Keywords

Moral Responsibility Moral Obligation Moral Dilemma Moral Claim Deontic Logic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Albert, H. (1985): Treatise on Critical Reason (M.V. Rorty, Trans.), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (Original work published 1968.)Google Scholar
  2. Alexander L. (1990). Reconsidering the relationship among voluntary acts, strict liability and negligence in criminal law. Social Philosophy and Policy 7: 84–104 Google Scholar
  3. al-Hibri A. (1978). Deontic Logic: A Comprehensive Appraisal and a New Proposal. University Press of America, Washington, DC Google Scholar
  4. Altham J.E.J. (1985). Wicked Promises. In: Hacking, I. (eds) Exercises in Analysis: Essays by Students of Casimir Lewy, pp 1–21. Cambridge University Press, New York Google Scholar
  5. Altham J.E.J. (1988). Understanding the logic of obligation. The Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume 62: 271–283 Google Scholar
  6. (1994). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV. American Psychiatric Association, Washington, DC Google Scholar
  7. Aquinas St.T. (1972). Summa Theologiae. Blackfriars , Oxford Google Scholar
  8. Atkinson R.F. (1958). The autonomy of morals. Analysis 18: 57–62 Google Scholar
  9. Audi R. (1974). Goldman on ability, excuses and constraint. The Journal of Value Inquiry 8: 225–236 Google Scholar
  10. Austin, J.L. (1979): A Plea for Excuses, in J.L. Austin, Philosophical Papers (3rd ed., pp. 175–204), New York: Oxford University Press (Originally published 1957.)Google Scholar
  11. Baltzly D. (2000). Moral dilemmas are not a local issue. Philosophy 75: 245–263 Google Scholar
  12. Berlin I. (1969). Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford University Press, New York Google Scholar
  13. Blum A. (2000). The Kantian versus Frankfurt. Analysis 60: 287–288 Google Scholar
  14. Brink D.O. (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University Press, New York Google Scholar
  15. Brink D.O. (1994). Moral conflict and its structure. The Philosophical Review 103: 215–247 Google Scholar
  16. Broad C.D. (1951). Five Types of Ethical Theory. Humanities Press , New York Google Scholar
  17. Brouwer F.E. (1969). A difficulty with ‘ought implies can’. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 7: 45–50 Google Scholar
  18. Brown J. (1977). Moral theory and the ought – can principle. Mind 86: 206–223 Google Scholar
  19. Carey T.V. (1985). What conflict of duty is not. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66: 204–215 Google Scholar
  20. Cohen S. (1982). Justification for a doctrine of strict liability. Social Theory and Practice 8: 213–229 Google Scholar
  21. Collingridge D.G. (1977). ‘Ought-implies-can’ and Hume’s rule. Philosophy 52: 348–351 Google Scholar
  22. Collingridge D.G. (1980). The autonomy of evaluation. The Journal of Value Inquiry 14: 119–127 Google Scholar
  23. Cooper N. (1966). Some presuppositions of moral judgments. Mind 75: 45–57 Google Scholar
  24. Copp D. (1997). Defending the principle of alternate possibilities: Blameworthiness and moral responsibility. Noûs 31: 441–456 Google Scholar
  25. Copp D. (2003). ‘Ought’ Implies ‘can’, Blameworthiness and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. In: Widerker, D. and McKenna, M. (eds) Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, pp 265–299. Ashgate, Burlington, VT Google Scholar
  26. Dahl N.O. (1974). “ ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ ” and deontic logic. Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 4: 485–511 Google Scholar
  27. Donagan A. (1984). Consistency in rationalist moral systems. The Journal of Philosophy 81: 291–309 Google Scholar
  28. Douglas J. and Olshaker M. (1995). Mindhunter: Inside the FBI’s Elite Serial Crime Unit. Pocket Books, New York Google Scholar
  29. Driver J. (1983). Promises, obligations and abilities. Philosophical Studies 44: 221–223 Google Scholar
  30. Ewing A.C. (1947). The Definition of Good. Hyperion Press, Westport, CT Google Scholar
  31. Fischer J.M. (1999). Recent work on moral responsibility. Ethics 110: 93–139 Google Scholar
  32. Fischer J.M. (2000). As go the Frankfurt examples, so goes deontic morality (comments on Ishtiyaque Haji’s presentation). The Journal of Ethics 4: 361–363 Google Scholar
  33. Fischer J.M. (2003). ‘Ought-implies-can’, causal determinism and moral responsibility. Analysis 63: 244–250 Google Scholar
  34. Fischer J.M. and Ravizza M. (1998). Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge University Press, New York Google Scholar
  35. Fletcher G.P. (1978). Rethinking Criminal Law. Little, Brown and Company, Boston Google Scholar
  36. Forrester J.W. (1989). Why You Should: The Pragmatics of Deontic Speech. University Press of New England, Hanover, NH Google Scholar
  37. Frankena W.K. (1958). Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy. In: Melden, A.I. (eds) Essays in Moral Philosophy, pp 40–81. University of Washington Press, Seattle, WA Google Scholar
  38. Frankena W.K. (1963). Obligation and Ability. In: Black, M. (eds) Philosophical Analysis: A Collection of Essays, pp 148–165. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ Google Scholar
  39. Frankena W.K. (1976). ‘Ought’ and ‘Is’ Once More. In: Goodpaster, K.E. (eds) Perspectives on Morality: Essays by William K. Frankena, pp 133–147. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN Google Scholar
  40. Frankfurt H.G. (1969). Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. The Journal of Philosophy 66: 829–839 Google Scholar
  41. Frankfurt H.G. (1988). What We Are Morally Responsible For. In: Frankfurt, H.G. (eds) The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays, pp 95–103. Cambridge University Press, New York Google Scholar
  42. Gensler H.J. (1996). Formal Ethics. Routledge, New York Google Scholar
  43. Gewirth A. (1982). The “Is-Ought” Problem Resolved. In: Gewirth, A. (eds) Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications, pp 100–127. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Google Scholar
  44. Gilbert M. (1972). The abilities of prescriptivism. Analysis 32: 141–144 Google Scholar
  45. Goldman A.I. (1970). A Theory of Human Action. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ Google Scholar
  46. Goldman H.S. (1976). Dated rightness and moral imperfection. The Philosophical Review 85: 449–487 Google Scholar
  47. Goldman M.J. (1998). Kleptomania: The Compulsion to Steal – What Can be Done?. New Horizon Press, Far Hills, NJ Google Scholar
  48. Gowans C.W. (1994). Innocence Lost: An Examination of Inescapable Moral Wrongdoing. Oxford University Press, New York Google Scholar
  49. Greenspan P.S. (1975). Conditional oughts and hypothetical imperatives. The Journal of Philosophy 72: 259–276 Google Scholar
  50. Griffin J. (1996). Value Judgment: Improving Our Ethical Beliefs. Clarendon Press, Oxford Google Scholar
  51. Haines N. (1972). Ought and can. Philosophy 47: 263 Google Scholar
  52. Haji I. (1993). Alternative possibilities, moral obligation and moral responsibility. Philosophical Papers 22: 41–50 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  53. Haji I. (1994). Doing the best one can and the principle of alternative possibilities. Southwest Philosophy Review 10: 113–127 Google Scholar
  54. Haji I. (1997). An epistemic dimension of blameworthiness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57: 523–544 Google Scholar
  55. Haji I. (1998a). Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals and Perplexities. Oxford University Press, New York Google Scholar
  56. Haji I. (1998b). Frankfurt-pairs and varieties of blameworthiness: Epistemic morals. Erkenntnis 47: 351–377 Google Scholar
  57. Haji I. (2002). Deontic Morality and Control. Cambridge University Press, New York Google Scholar
  58. Haji I. (2003). Flickers of freedom, obligation and responsibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 40: 287–302 Google Scholar
  59. Hampshire S. (1951). Freedom of the will. The Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume 25: 161–178 Google Scholar
  60. Hansson S.O. (1999). But what should I do?. Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 27: 433–440 Google Scholar
  61. Hare R.M. (1951). Freedom of the will. The Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume 25: 201–216 Google Scholar
  62. Hare R.M. (1963). Freedom and Reason. Clarendon Press, Oxford Google Scholar
  63. Harrison J. (1967). Ethical Naturalism. In: Edwards, P. (eds) The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, pp. Macmillan, New York Google Scholar
  64. Hart H.L.A. (1968). Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility. In: Hart, H.L.A. (eds) Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law, pp 158–185. Clarendon Press , Oxford Google Scholar
  65. Hart H.L.A. (1994). The Concept of Law. Clarendon Press, Oxford Google Scholar
  66. Heintz L.L. (1975). Excuses and ‘“ought” implies “can”’. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5: 449–462 Google Scholar
  67. Henderson G.P. (1966). ‘ “Ought” implies “can” ’. Philosophy 41: 101–112 Google Scholar
  68. Herman B. (1990). Obligation and Performance: A Kantian Account of Moral Conflict. In: Flanagan, O. and Rorty, A.O. (eds) Identity, Character,␣and␣Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology, pp 311–337. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA Google Scholar
  69. Hintikka J. (1969). Deontic Logic and its Philosophical Morals. In: (eds) Models for Modalities: Selected Essays, pp 184–214. Reidel, Dordrecht Google Scholar
  70. Hintikka J. (1971). Some Main Problems of Deontic Logic. In: Hilpinen, R. (eds) Deontic Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings, pp 59–104. Reidel, Dordrecht Google Scholar
  71. Howard-Snyder F. (1997). The rejection of objective consequentialism. Utilitas 9: 241–248 Google Scholar
  72. Hudson, W.D. (ed). (1969) : The Is-Ought Question: A Collection of Papers on The Central Problem in Moral Philosophy, London: MacmillanGoogle Scholar
  73. Humberstone I.L. (1982). First steps in philosophical taxonomy. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12: 467–478 Google Scholar
  74. Humberstone I.L. (1996). A study in philosophical taxonomy. Philosophical Studies 83: 121–169 Google Scholar
  75. Hume D. (1978). A Treatise of Human Nature. Clarendon Press , Oxford Google Scholar
  76. Jackson F. (1988). Understanding the logic of obligation. The Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume 62: 255–270 Google Scholar
  77. Jacobs R.A. (1985). Is “ought implies can” a moral principle?. Southwest Philosophy Review 2: 43–54 Google Scholar
  78. Johansson I. (1999). Hume’s surprise and the logic of belief changes. Synthese 117: 275–291 Google Scholar
  79. Kading D. (1954). Does “ought” imply “can”?. Philosophical Studies 5: 11–15 Google Scholar
  80. Kant, I. (1996a): Groundwork of The Metaphysics of Morals (M.J. Gregor, Trans.), in I. Kant, Practical Philosophy (pp. 37–108), New York: Cambridge University Press (Original work published 1785.).Google Scholar
  81. Kant, I. (1996b): Critique of Practical Reason (M.J. Gregor, Trans.), in I. Kant, Practical Philosophy (pp. 133–271), New York: Cambridge University Press (Original work published 1788.).Google Scholar
  82. Kant, I. (1996c): Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (G. di Giovanni, Trans.), in I. Kant, Religion and Rational Theology (pp. 39–215), New York: Cambridge University Press (Original work published 1793.).Google Scholar
  83. Kant, I. (1996d): On the Common Saying: That May be Correct in Theory, But It is of No Use in Practice (M.J. Gregor, Trans.), in I. Kant, Practical Philosophy (pp. 273–309), New York: Cambridge University Press (Original work published 1793.).Google Scholar
  84. Kant, I. (1996e): The Metaphysics of Morals (M.J. Gregor, Trans.), in I. Kant, Practical Philosophy (pp. 353–603), New York: Cambridge University Press (Original work published 1797.).Google Scholar
  85. Kant I. (1998). Critique of Pure Reason (P. Guyer and A.W. Wood, Trans.). Cambridge University Press, New York Google Scholar
  86. Kekes J. (1984). ‘Ought implies can’ and two kinds of morality. The Philosophical Quarterly 34: 459–467 Google Scholar
  87. Kekes J. (1997). Against Liberalism. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY Google Scholar
  88. Kielkopf C.F. (1967). ‘Ought’ does not imply ‘can’. Theoria 33: 283–289 Google Scholar
  89. Kirwan C. (1998). Pelagianism, in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge, New York Google Scholar
  90. Ladd J. (1958). Remarks on the conflict of obligations. The Journal of Philosophy 55: 811–819 Google Scholar
  91. Lamb J.W. (1993). Evaluative compatibilism and the principle of alternate possibilities. The Journal of Philosophy 90: 517–527 Google Scholar
  92. Lemmon E.J. (1962). Moral dilemmas. The Philosophical Review 71: 139–158 Google Scholar
  93. Lemmon E.J. (1965). Deontic logic and the logic of imperatives. Logique et Analyse 8: 39–71 Google Scholar
  94. Lewis D.K. (1973). Counterfactuals. Blackwell, Oxford Google Scholar
  95. Maclagan W.G. (1951). Freedom of the will. The Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume 25: 179–200 Google Scholar
  96. Mann W.E. (1983). Dreams of immorality. Philosophy 58: 378–385 Google Scholar
  97. Mann W.E. (1991). Jephthah’s plight: Moral dilemmas and theism. Philosophical Perspectives 5: 617–647 Google Scholar
  98. Manning R.C. (1981). “Ought implies can” and the price of duty. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 19: 117–121 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  99. Manor, R. (1971): Conditional forms: Assertion, necessity, obligation and commands. Doctoral dissertation, University of PittsburghGoogle Scholar
  100. Marcus R.B. (1980). Moral dilemmas and consistency. The Journal of Philosophy 77: 121–136 Google Scholar
  101. Marcus R.B. (1996). More About Moral Dilemmas. In: Mason, H.E. (eds) Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory, pp 23–35. Oxford University Press, New York Google Scholar
  102. Margolis J. (1967). One last time: ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’. The Personalist 48: 33–41 Google Scholar
  103. Margolis J. (1971). “Ought” implies “can”. The Philosophical Forum 2: 479–488 Google Scholar
  104. Martinich A.P. (1985). A solution to a paradox of promising. Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 15: 117–121 Google Scholar
  105. Martinich A.P. (1987). Obligation, ability and prima facie promising. Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 17: 323–330 Google Scholar
  106. Matthews, G.B. (1998): Augustine, in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Vol. 1, pp. 541–559), New York: RoutledgeGoogle Scholar
  107. Mavrodes G.I. (1964). ‘Is’ and ‘ought’. Analysis 25: 42–44 Google Scholar
  108. Mavrodes G.I. (1968). On deriving the normative from the nonnormative. Papers of the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts and Letters 53: 353–365 Google Scholar
  109. McConnell, T.C. (1975): Moral dilemmas and ethical consistency. Doctoral dissertation, University of MinnesotaGoogle Scholar
  110. McConnell T.C. (1989). “‘Ought’ implies ‘can’” and the scope of moral requirements. Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 19: 437–454 Google Scholar
  111. McDonald, J.M. (1987): Moral dilemmas and the priority thesis. Doctoral dissertation, University of Notre DameGoogle Scholar
  112. Mellema G. (2001). Praise, blame and the ought implies can principle. Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 28: 425–436 Google Scholar
  113. Montefiore A. (1958). ‘Ought’ and ‘can’. The Philosophical Quarterly 8: 24–40 Google Scholar
  114. Moore G.E. (1922). Philosophical Studies. Harcourt, Brace & Co, New York Google Scholar
  115. Moritz M. (1953). Verpflichtung und Freiheit. Über den Satz “sollen impliziert können”. Theoria 19: 131–171 Google Scholar
  116. Moritz M. (1968). On second order norms: An interpretation of ‘ought implies can’ and ‘is commanded implies is permitted’. Ratio 10: 101–115 Google Scholar
  117. Morris, M.K. (1985): Moral dilemmas and forms of moral distress. Doctoral dissertation, University of PittsburghGoogle Scholar
  118. Morscher E. (1972). From ‘is’ to ‘ought’ via ‘knowing’. Ethics 83: 84–86 Google Scholar
  119. Morscher E. (1974). Das Sein-Sollen-Problem logisch betrachtet: Eine Übersicht Über den gegenwärtigen Stand der Diskussion. Conceptus 8(25): 5–29 Google Scholar
  120. Morscher E. (1984). Sein-Sollen-Schlüsse und wie Schlüsse sein sollen. In: Krawietz, W., Schelsky, H., Winkler, G. and Schramm, A. (eds) Theorie der Normen: Festgabe für Ota Weinberger zum 65. Geburtstag, pp 421–439. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin Google Scholar
  121. Nagel T. (1979). War and Massacre. In: Nagel, T. (eds) Mortal Questions, pp 53–74. Cambridge University Press (Originally published 1972.), New York Google Scholar
  122. Pereboom D. (2001). Living Without Free Will. Cambridge University Press, New York Google Scholar
  123. Pigden C.R. (1990). Ought-implies-can: Erasmus Luther and R.M. Hare. Sophia 29: 2–30 Google Scholar
  124. Prior A.N. (1960). The autonomy of ethics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38: 197–206 Google Scholar
  125. Prior A.N. (1971). Objects of Thought (P.T. Geach and A. J.P. Kenny, eds.). Clarendon Press, Oxford Google Scholar
  126. Qizilbash M. (1995). Obligation, human frailty and utilitarianism. Utilitas 7: 145–156 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  127. Rees W.J. (1953). Moral rules and the analysis of “ought”. The Philosophical Review 62: 23–40 Google Scholar
  128. Rescher N. (1987). Ethical Idealism: An Inquiry into the Nature and Function of Ideals. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA Google Scholar
  129. Richman R.J. (1983). God, Free Will and Morality: Prolegomena to a Theory of Practical Reasoning. Reidel, Dordrecht Google Scholar
  130. Robinson R. (1971). Ought and ought not. Philosophy 46: 193–202 Google Scholar
  131. Ross W.D. (1939). Foundations of Ethics: The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of Aberdeen, 1935–6. Clarendon Press, Oxford Google Scholar
  132. Routley R. and Plumwood V. (1989). Moral Dilemmas and the Logic of Deontic Notions. In: Priest, G., Routley, R. and Norman, J. (eds) Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent, pp 653–690. Philosophia, Munich Google Scholar
  133. Rynin D. (1957). The autonomy of morals. Mind 66: 308–317 Google Scholar
  134. Saka P. (2000). Ought does not imply can. American Philosophical Quarterly 37: 93–105 Google Scholar
  135. Sapontzis S.F. (1991). “ ‘Ought’ does imply ‘can’ ”. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 29: 383–393 Google Scholar
  136. Sayre-McCord G. (1986). Deontic logic and the priority of moral theory. Noûs 20: 179–197 Google Scholar
  137. Schlossberger E. (1989). With virtue for all: Against the democratic theory of virtue. Southwest Philosophy Review 5: 71–76 Google Scholar
  138. Schnall I.M. (2001). The principle of alternate possibilities and ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. Analysis 61: 335–340 Google Scholar
  139. Schurz G. (1991). How far can Hume’s is-ought thesis be generalized? An␣investigation in alethic-deontic modal predicate logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 20: 37–95 Google Scholar
  140. Schurz G. (1994). Hume’s is-ought thesis in logics with alethic-deontic bridge principles. Logique et Analyse 37: 265–293 Google Scholar
  141. Schurz G. (1997). The Is-Ought Problem: An Investigation in Philosophical Logic. Kluwer, Dordrecht Google Scholar
  142. Searle J.R. (1964). How to derive “ought” from “is”. The Philosophical Review 73: 43–58 Google Scholar
  143. Searle J.R. (1969). Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press, New York Google Scholar
  144. Shaw P.D. (1965). Ought and can. Analysis 25: 196–197 Google Scholar
  145. Sidgwick H. (1981). The Methods of Ethics. Hackett, Indianapolis, IN Google Scholar
  146. Sinnott-Armstrong W. (1984). ‘Ought’ conversationally implies ‘can’. The Philosophical Review 93: 249–261 Google Scholar
  147. Sinnott-Armstrong W. (1987). A resolution of a paradox of promising. Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 17: 77–82 Google Scholar
  148. Sinnott-Armstrong W. (1988a). Moral Dilemmas. Blackwell, Oxford Google Scholar
  149. Sinnott-Armstrong W. (1988b). Promises which cannot be kept. Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 18: 399–407 Google Scholar
  150. Smith J.W. (1961). Impossibility and morals. Mind 70: 362–375 Google Scholar
  151. Statman D. (1995). Moral Dilemmas. Rodopi, Amsterdam Google Scholar
  152. Stern R. (2004). Does ‘ought’ imply ‘can’? And did Kant think it does?. Utilitas 16: 42–61 Google Scholar
  153. Stocker M. (1971). ‘Ought’ and ‘can’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49: 303–316 Google Scholar
  154. Stocker M. (1987). Moral conflicts: What they are and what they show. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 68: 104–123 Google Scholar
  155. Strasser M.P. (1992). Agency, Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Hollowbrook Publishing, Wakefield, NH Google Scholar
  156. Suttle B. (1988). Duties and Excusing Conditions. In: Lee, S.H. (eds) Inquiries into Values: The Inaugural Session of the International Society for Value Inquiry, pp 119–129. Edwin Mellen Press, Lewiston, NY Google Scholar
  157. Tännsjö T. (1976). The Relevance of Metaethics to Ethics. Almqvist & Wiksell, Stockholm Google Scholar
  158. Taylor, P.W. (ed). (1967): Problems of Moral Philosophy: An Introduction to Ethics, Belmont, CA: DickensonGoogle Scholar
  159. Thomason R.H. (1981). Deontic Logic and The Role of Freedom in Moral Deliberation. In: Hilpinen, R. (eds) New Studies in Deontic Logic: Norms, Actions and the Foundations of Ethics, pp 177–186. Reidel, Dordrecht Google Scholar
  160. Timmermann, J. (2003): Sollen und Kónnen: “Du kannst, denn du sollst” und “Sollen impliziert Kónnen” im Vergleich, in U. Meixner and A. Newen (eds.), Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy: Vol. 6. History of Ethics (pp. 113–122), Paderborn: Mentis.Google Scholar
  161. Tranøy K.E. (1972). ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’: A bridge from fact to norm? Part I. Ratio 14: 116–130 Google Scholar
  162. Trigg R. (1971). Moral conflict. Mind 80: 41–55 Google Scholar
  163. (1982). A system of temporally relative modal and deontic predicate logic and its philosophical applications. Logique et Analyse 25: 249–290 Google Scholar
  164. Vihvelin K. (2000). Freedom, foreknowledge and the principle of alternate possibilities. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30: 1–23 Google Scholar
  165. (1977). Das Humesche Gesetz. Grazer Philosophische Studien 4: 1–14 Google Scholar
  166. (1963). Norm and Action: A Logical Enquiry. Humanities Press, New York Google Scholar
  167. Wallace R.J. (1994). Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA Google Scholar
  168. Wasserstrom R.A. (1960). Strict liability in the criminal law. Stanford Law Review 12: 731–745 Google Scholar
  169. Wedeking, G.A. (1969): A Critical examination of command logic. Doctoral dissertation, Washington University, Saint LouisGoogle Scholar
  170. White A.R. (1975). Modal Thinking. Blackwell, Oxford Google Scholar
  171. White M. (1959). Historical Inevitability. In: White, M. (eds) Religion, Politics and The Higher Learning: A Collection of Essays, pp 75–84. , Cambridge, MA Google Scholar
  172. White M. (1979). Oughts and Cans. In: Ryan, A. (eds) The Idea of Freedom: Essays in Honour of Isaiah Berlin, pp 211–219. Oxford University Press, New York Google Scholar
  173. M. White 1981, What Is and What Ought to Be Done: An Essay on Ethics and Epistemology, New York: Oxford University PressGoogle Scholar
  174. (1981). What is and What Ought to be Done: An Essay on Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press, New York Google Scholar
  175. Widerker D. (1991). Frankfurt on ‘ought implies can’ and alternative possibilities. Analysis 51: 222–224 Google Scholar
  176. Widerker D. (1995). Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s attack on the principle of alternative possibilities. The Philosophical Review 104: 247–261 Google Scholar
  177. Widerker D. and Katzoff C. (1994). Zimmerman on moral responsibility, obligation and alternate possibilities. Analysis 54: 285–287 Google Scholar
  178. Williams, B.A.O. (1973): Ethical Consistency, in B.A.O. Williams (ed.), Problems of the Self (pp. 166–186), New York: Cambridge University Press (Originally published 1965.)Google Scholar
  179. Wollschläger C. (1970). Die Entstehung der Unmöglichkeitslehre: Zur Dogmengeschichte des Rechts der Leistungsstörungen. Böhlau, Cologne Google Scholar
  180. Yaffe G. (1999). ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ and the principle of alternate possibilities. Analysis 59: 218–222 Google Scholar
  181. Young R. (1975). Freedom, Responsibility and God. Harper & Row, New York Google Scholar
  182. Zimmerman M.J. (1987). Remote obligation. American Philosophical Quarterly 24: 199–205 Google Scholar
  183. Zimmerman M.J. (1993). Obligation, responsibility and alternate possibilities. Analysis 53: 51–53 Google Scholar
  184. Zimmerman M.J. (1996). The Concept of Moral Obligation. Cambridge University Press, New York Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Wisconsin-MadisonMadisonUSA

Personalised recommendations