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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 132, Issue 1, pp 87–97 | Cite as

Perception and its objects

  • Bill BrewerEmail author
Original Paper

Abstract

Early modern empiricists thought that the nature of perceptual experience is given by citing the object presented to the mind in that experience. Hallucination and illusion suggest that this requires untenable mind-dependent objects. Current orthodoxy replaces the appeal to direct objects with the claim that perceptual experience is characterized instead by its representational content. This paper argues that the move to content is problematic, and reclaims the early modern empiricist insight as perfectly consistent, even in cases of illusion, with the realist contention that these direct objects of perception are the persisting mind-independent physical objects we all know and love.

Keywords

Direct object of perception Mind-independence Empirical realism Representational content Subjective character Illusion Hallucination Phenomenology Content view Object view 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of WarwickCoventryUK

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