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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 138, Issue 2, pp 245–269 | Cite as

Sleeping beauty and the dynamics of de se beliefs

  • Christopher J. G. Meacham
ORIGINAL PAPER

Abstract

This paper examines three accounts of the sleeping beauty case: an account proposed by Adam Elga, an account proposed by David Lewis, and a third account defended in this paper. It provides two reasons for preferring the third account. First, this account does a good job of capturing the temporal continuity of our beliefs, while the accounts favored by Elga and Lewis do not. Second, Elga’s and Lewis’ treatments of the sleeping beauty case lead to highly counterintuitive consequences. The proposed account also leads to counterintuitive consequences, but they’re not as bad as those of Elga’s account, and no worse than those of Lewis’ account.

Keywords

De se beliefs Updating rule Belief dynamics Sleeping beauty Elga Lewis 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Rutgers UniversityNew BrunswickUnited States

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