Philosophical Studies

, Volume 133, Issue 1, pp 131–141 | Cite as

Extended simples

ORIGINAL PAPER
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Abstract

I argue that extended simples are possible. The argument given here parallels an argument given elsewhere for the claim that the shape properties of material objects are extrinsic, not intrinsic as is commonly supposed. In the final section of the paper, I show that if the shape properties of material objects are extrinsic, the most popular argument against extended simples fails.

Keywords

Intrinsic Property Material Object Extended Simple Proper Part Shape Property 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentSyracuse UniversitySyracuseUSA

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