A paradox for some theories of welfare
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Sometimes people desire that their lives go badly, take pleasure in their lives going badly, or believe that their lives are going badly. As a result, some popular theories of welfare are paradoxical. I show that no attempt to defend those theories from the paradox fully succeeds.
KeywordsValue Welfare Desire Hedonism Paradox
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