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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 131, Issue 1, pp 61–99 | Cite as

On characterizing the physical

  • Jessica WilsonEmail author
Article

Abstract

How should physical entities be characterized? Physicalists, who have most to do with the notion, usually characterize the physical by reference to two components,1

1. The physical entities are the entities treated by fundamental physics with the proviso that

2. Physical entities are not fundamentally mental (that is, do not individually possess or bestow mentality).

Here I will explore the extent to which appeals to fundamental physics and to the NFM (no fundamental mentality) constraint are appropriate for characterizing the physical, especially for purposes of formulating physicalism. I will motivate and defend a version of an account incorporating both components.

Keywords

Moral Agency Body Problem Physical Entity Mental Causation Future Physic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of TorontoTorontoCanada

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