Philosophical Studies

, Volume 138, Issue 1, pp 17–27

Weighing pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief

Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s11098-006-0007-3

Cite this article as:
Reisner, A. Philos Stud (2008) 138: 17. doi:10.1007/s11098-006-0007-3

Abstract

In this paper I argue that we can give a plausible account of how to compare pragmatic and evidential normative reasons for belief. The account I offer is given in the form of a ‘defeasing function’. This function allows for a sophisticated comparison of the two types of reasons without assigning complex features to the logical structures of either type of reason.

Keywords

Pragmatic reasons Evidential reasons Reasons for belief Defeasing Weighing Pragmatism 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyMcGill UniversityMontrealCanada

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