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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 137, Issue 2, pp 159–181 | Cite as

Frege and the Paradox of Analysis

  • Michael Nelson
Article

Abstract

In an unpublished manuscript of 1914 titled ‘Logic in mathematics’, Gottlob Frege offered a rich account of the paradox of analysis. I argue that Frege there claims that the explicandum and explicans of a successful analysis express the same sense and that he furthermore appreciated that this requires that one cannot conclude that two sentences differ in sense simply because it is possible for a (minimally) competent speaker to accept one without accepting the other. I claim that this is shown by Frege’s suggestive remarks about a cloudy grasp of a sense. I then argue that this fact calls into question a key assumption behind Frege’s master argument for the sense/reference distinction.

Keywords

Conceptual Analysis Complex Expression Successful Analysis Linguistic Meaning Competent Speaker 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUC RiversideRiverside

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