Philosophical Studies

, Volume 128, Issue 1, pp 169–199 | Cite as

On Logics of Knowledge and Belief

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Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Linguistics and PhilosophyMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyCambridgeUSA

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