Philosophical Studies

, Volume 132, Issue 3, pp 525–551 | Cite as

Anti-realism and Epistemic Accessibility

  • C. S. JenkinsEmail author


I argue that Fitch’s ‘paradox of knowability’ presents no special problem for the epistemic anti-realist who believes that reality is epistemically accessible to us. For the claim which is the target of the argument (If p then it is possible to know p) is not a commitment of anti-realism. The epistemic anti-realist’s commitment is (or should be) to the recognizability of the states of affairs which render true propositions true, not to the knowability of the propositions themselves. A formal apparatus for discussing the recognizability of states of affairs is offered, and other prima facie similar approaches to the paradox argument are reviewed.


Actual World True Proposition Disjunctive Property Formal Apparatus Actual Thing 
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Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Arché AHRB Research Centre, School of Philosophical and Anthropological StudiesUniversity of St AndrewsSt Andrews, FifeUK

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