Even zombies Can be Surprised: A Reply to Graham And Horgan
In their paper “Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary” (2000), George Graham and Terence Horgan argue, contrary to a widespread view, that the so- called Knowledge Argument may after all pose a problem for certain materialist accounts of perceptual experience. I propose a reply to Graham and Horgan on the materialist’s behalf, making use of a distinction between knowing what it’s like to see something F and knowing how F things look.
KeywordsPerceptual Experience Knowledge Argument Widespread View Materialist Account
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