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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 122, Issue 2, pp 189–202 | Cite as

Even zombies Can be Surprised: A Reply to Graham And Horgan

  • Diana Raffman
Article

Abstract

In their paper “Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary” (2000), George Graham and Terence Horgan argue, contrary to a widespread view, that the so- called Knowledge Argument may after all pose a problem for certain materialist accounts of perceptual experience. I propose a reply to Graham and Horgan on the materialist’s behalf, making use of a distinction between knowing what it’s like to see something F and knowing how F things look.

Keywords

Perceptual Experience Knowledge Argument Widespread View Materialist Account 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Ohio State UniversityUSA

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