Philosophical Studies

, Volume 129, Issue 2, pp 171–196 | Cite as

The Trouble with Externalist Compatibilist Autonomy



In this paper, I try to show that externalist compatibilism in the debate on personal autonomy and manipulated freedom is as yet untenable. I will argue that Alfred R. Mele’s paradigmatic, history-sensitive externalism about psychological autonomy in general and autonomous deliberation in particular faces an insurmountable problem: it cannot satisfy the crucial condition of adequacy “H” for externalist theories that I formulate in the text. Specifically, I will argue that, contrary to first appearances, externalist compatibilism does not resolve the CNC manipulation problem. After briefly reflecting on the present status of responses to the manipulation problem in the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists of various stripes, I will draw the over-all pessimistic conclusion that no party deals with this problem satisfactorily.


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Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of PhilosophyKatholieke Universiteit LeuvenLeuvenBelgium

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