Philosophical Studies

, Volume 127, Issue 3, pp 415–457 | Cite as

What Should a Correspondence Theory Be and Do?

  • Patricia MarinoEmail author


Correspondence theories are frequently either too vaguely expressed – “true statements correspond to the way things are in the world,” or implausible – “true statements mirror raw, mind-independent reality.” I address this problem by developing features and roles that ought to characterize what I call ldquo;modest” correspondence theories. Of special importance is the role of correspondence in directing our responses to cases of suspected non-factuality; lack of straightforward correspondence shows the need for, and guides us in our choice of, various kinds of reconstrual projects. This, I argue, is in contrast to the approaches suggested by deflationism and coherence, and thus modest correspondence theories are appropriately distinct from rivals


True Statement Special Importance Correspondence Theory Straightforward Correspondence 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. Alcoff L.M. (2001). ‘The Case for Coherence’. in Lynch (2001), pp. 159–182.Google Scholar
  2. Alston, W. 1996A Realist Conception of TruthCornell University PressIthacaGoogle Scholar
  3. Armstrong, D. 1997A World of States of AffairsCambridge University PressCambridgeGoogle Scholar
  4. Austin J.L. (1950): ‘Truth’, repr. in G. Pitcher (ed.), (1964), pp. 18–31. First published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. suppl. vol. 24, pp. 111–129.Google Scholar
  5. Austin, J. L. (1961): ‘Unfair to Facts’, S. Blackburn and K. Simmons (eds.), (1999), pp. 182–199. Selection from ‘Unfair to Facts’, Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 102–122.Google Scholar
  6. Ayer, A. J. (1935): ‘The Criterion of Truth’, repr. in G. Macdonald (ed.), (1954): pp. 236–241. First published in Analysis 3.Google Scholar
  7. Ayer, A. J. 1946‘Language, Truth, and Logic’2DoverNew York1952Google Scholar
  8. Ayer A.J. (1963). ‘Truth’. in Ayer, The Concept of a Person. London: Macmillan, pp. 162–187.Google Scholar
  9. Blackburn, S. 1993Essays in Quasi-RealismOxford University PressNew YorkGoogle Scholar
  10. Blackburn, S. 1994The Oxford Dictionary of PhilosophyOxford University PressOxfordGoogle Scholar
  11. Blackburn, S. 1998Ruling PassionsOxford University PressNew YorkGoogle Scholar
  12. Blackburn, S.Simmons, K. eds. 1999TruthOxford University PressNew YorkGoogle Scholar
  13. Bradley, F. H. (1907): ‘On Truth and Copying’, in S. Blackburn and K. Simmons (eds.), (1999), pp. 31–45. Selection from ‘On Truth and Copying’, Mind 16.Google Scholar
  14. Burgess, J., Rosen, G. 1997A Subject With No ObjectOxford University PressNew YorkGoogle Scholar
  15. Davidson D. (1988). ‘Epistemology and Truth’ reprinted in his Subjective. Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.Google Scholar
  16. Devitt, M. 1991Realism and Truth2Princeton University PressPrincetonGoogle Scholar
  17. Ebbs, G. 1997Rule-Following and RealismHarvard University PressCambridge MAGoogle Scholar
  18. Ebbs, G. (2003): ‘Denotation and Discovery’, in F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Metaphysics. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. An earlier version was presented at the 2000 Central Division meeting of the APA, with Mark Wilson as commentator.Google Scholar
  19. Field, H. 1972‘Tarski’s Theory of Truth’Journal of Philosophy69347375Google Scholar
  20. Field, H. (1986): ‘The Deflationary Conception of Truth’, in G. Macdonald and C. Wright (eds.), (1986), pp. 55–117.Google Scholar
  21. Field, H. (1994a): ‘Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content’, in S. Blackburn and K. Simmons (eds.), (1999), pp. 351–391. Selection from Field, ‘Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content’, Mind 103, 249–284.Google Scholar
  22. Field, H. 1994b‘Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse’The Philosophical Review103405452Google Scholar
  23. Gibbard, A. 1990Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative JudgmentHarvard University PressCambridge, MAGoogle Scholar
  24. Hale, B., Wright, C. 1997aA Companion to the Philosophy of LanguageBlackwell PublishersMalden, MAGoogle Scholar
  25. Hempel, C. 1935a‘On The Logical Positivists’ Theory of Truth’Analysis24959Google Scholar
  26. Hempel, C. (1935b): ‘Some Remarks on Facts and Propositions’, repr. in Selected Philosophical Essays. R. Jeffrey (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. First published Analysis</it> 2, 93–96.Google Scholar
  27. Horgan, T. (2001): ‘Contextual Semantics and Metaphysical Realism: Truth as Indirect Correspondence’, in Lynch (2001), pp. 67–95.Google Scholar
  28. Horwich, P. 1982‘Three Forms of Realism’, Synthese51181201Google Scholar
  29. Horwich, P. 1993‘Gibbard’s Theory of Norms’Philosophy and Public Affairs226778Google Scholar
  30. Horwich, P. (1990/98): Truth. 2nd edn. (1st edn., 1990), New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  31. Kitcher, P. 1978‘Theories, Theorists, and Theoretical Change’Philosophical Review87519547Google Scholar
  32. Kraut, R. 1993‘Robust Deflationism’Philosophical Review102247263Google Scholar
  33. Leeds, S. 1978‘Theories of Reference and Truth’Erkenntnis13111129CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Leeds, S. 1995‘Truth, Correspondence, and Success’Philosophical Studies79136CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Lynch, M. 1998Truth in ContextMIT PressCambridge MAGoogle Scholar
  36. Lynch, M. 2001The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary PerspectivesMIT PressCambridge MAGoogle Scholar
  37. Newman, A. 2002The Correspondence Theory of TruthCambridge University PressCambridgeGoogle Scholar
  38. Patterson, D. 2003‘What Is a Correspondence Theory of Truth?’Synthese137421444CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. Prior, A. 1967‘Correspondence Theory of Truth’Edwards, P. eds. The Encyclopedia of PhilosophyMacmillanNew York223232Google Scholar
  40. Putnam, H. 1978Meaning and the Moral SciencesRoutledgeBostonGoogle Scholar
  41. Russell B. (1906–7): ‘On the Nature of Truth’, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 7, 28–49.Google Scholar
  42. Russell, B. 1912The Problems of PhilosophyOxford University PressOxford1997Google Scholar
  43. Russell, B. (1918): ‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism’, repr. in D. Pears (ed.), The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1985. First published in The Monist in 1918.Google Scholar
  44. Strawson, P. F. (1950): ‘Truth’, repr. in G. Pitcher (ed.), (1964), pp. 18–53. First published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. suppl. vol. 24, 129–156. Also reprinted in P. F. Strawson (1971), pp. 190–213.Google Scholar
  45. Strawson, P. F. (1964): ‘A Problem about Truth – A Reply to Mr. Warnock’, in G. Pitcher (ed.), (1964), pp. 68–84.Google Scholar
  46. Strawson, P. F. (1965): ‘Truth: A Reconsideration of Austin’s Views’, repr. in P. F. Strawson (ed.), (1971), pp. 234–249.Google Scholar
  47. Strawson, P. F. 1971Logico-Linguistic PapersMethuenLondonGoogle Scholar
  48. Tritton, D.J. 1977Physical Fluid DynamicsVan Nostrand ReinholdNew YorkGoogle Scholar
  49. Walker, R. C. S. (1997): ‘Theories of Truth’, in B. Hale and C. Wright (eds.), (1997), pp. 309–330.Google Scholar
  50. Walker, R.C.S. 1989The Coherence Theory of Truth: Realism, Anti-Realism, IdealismRoutledgeLondonGoogle Scholar
  51. Williams, B. 1995‘Truth in Ethics’Ratio8227242Google Scholar
  52. Williams, M. 1986‘Do We (Epistemologists) Need a Theory of Truth?’Philosophical Topics14223242Google Scholar
  53. Wilson, M. 1982‘Predicate Meets Property’Philosophical Review91549589Google Scholar
  54. Wilson, M. 1994‘Can We Trust Logical Form?’Journal of Philosophy91519544Google Scholar
  55. Wilson, M. 2000‘Inference and Correlational Truth’Chapuis, A.Gupta, A eds. Circularity, Definition and TruthIndian Council on Philosophical ResearchNew Delhi371395Google Scholar
  56. Wittgenstein, L. 1921Tractatus Logico-PhilosophicusRoutledgeLondon[1961. Trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness].Google Scholar
  57. Wright, C. 1992Truth and ObjectivityHarvard University PressCambridge MAGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyStanford UniversityStanfordUSA

Personalised recommendations